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Abstract 
There have been profound changes in both political and economic institutions in China 
over the last twenty years.  Moreover, the pace of transition has led to variation across the 
country in the level of development. In this paper, we use panel data for the Chinese prov-
inces to study the role of legal institutions, financial deepening and political pluralism on 
growth rates. The most important institutional developments for a transition economy are 
the emergence and legalization of the market economy, the establishment of secure prop-
erty rights, the growth of a private sector, the development of financial sector institutions 
and markets, and the liberalization of political institutions. We develop measures of these 
phenomena, which are used as explanatory variables in regression models to explain pro-
vincial GDP growth rates. Our evidence suggests that the development of financial mar-
kets, legal environment, awareness of property rights and political pluralism are associated 
with stronger growth.   
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Kiinan poliittiset ja taloudelliset instituutiot ovat muuttuneet hyvin paljon kahden viime 
vuosikymmenen aikana. Muutosten takia Kiinan eri alueiden taloudellinen kehitystaso vai-
htelee nykyään varsin paljon. Tässä tutkimuksessa käytetään Kiinan provinsseja koskevaa 
paneelidataa sen selvittämiseksi, miten juridiset instituutiot, finanssimarkkinoiden kehity-
saste ja poliittinen moniarvoisuus vaikuttavat alueellisiin kasvuvauhteihin. Siirtymätalouk-
sille tärkeimpiä institutionaalisia muutoksia ovat markkinatalouden kehittyminen, omistu-
soikeuden juridisen pohjan vahvistuminen, yksityissektorin kasvu, rahoitusmarkkinoiden 
synty ja kehitys sekä poliittisten instituutioiden liberalisointi. Tutkimuksessa pyritään mit-
taamaan näitä muutoksia ja käytetään mittareita regressiomalleissa selittämään provinssien 
BKT-kasvuvauhteja. Tuloksien mukaan rahoitusmarkkinoiden ja juridisten instituutioiden 
kehittyminen, omistusoikeudet ja poliittinen moniarvoisuus ovat kaikki positiivisesti korre-
loituneita taloudellisen kasvun kanssa. 
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1  Introduction 
 
 
The late twentieth century has witnessed the transformation of numerous economies 
around the world from centrally planned to market systems. The most common transition 
path was a “Big Bang” (Hoff and Stiglitz, 2004), which was characterized by economic 
liberalization preceded by massive force of democratization and followed by privatization. 
Democratization and economic liberalization generally accelerate growth with the estab-
lishment of specific institutions, which in turn determine other economic policies (Persson 
and Tabellini, 2006).  Economists have long been interested in the role of institutions and 
financial markets in explaining economic transitions and growth. Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) argue that financial development facilitates economic growth by reducing the costs 
of external finance to firms; their empirical evidence from a cross-country study also sup-
ports this rationale. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) examine the effects of differences 
in local financial development, which can explain the spread of entrepreneurship and 
economic growth. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998, 2000), 
hereinafter LLSV, study the relationship between law and finance, and consequently 
economic development, and highlight the importance of legal institutions.  
China has followed a quite different path where economic reform and transition to a 
market economy occurred without democratization, liberalization proceeded only incre-
mentally and privatization was delayed until almost two decades after the initiation of re-
forms. The development of China, featured by its incremental and experimental approach 
to reforms, has generated high and stable growth over the last three decades (Prasad and 
Rajan, 2006). This remarkable growth performance accompanied by a relatively undevel-
oped legal and financial system makes China a puzzle. According to Allen, Qian and Qian 
(2005), China seems like “a counterexample to the findings in law, institutions, finance and 
economic growth literatures.” They document the poor legal protection of minority and 
outside investors and the dominant role of the state public sectors. Cull and Xu (2005), us-
ing a survey of managers, find that expropriation risk plays a role in Chinese firms’ rein-
vestment decisions.   
These prior studies shed some light on the unique features of Chinese law, institu-
tions and financial system, and indicate the important role played by the Chinese institu-Iftekhar Hasan, Paul Wachtel and Mingming Zhou  
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tional setting in the economic growth. However, none of these studies relates China’s re-
gional economic growth to the differences across the vast country in the timing and extent 
of institutional development.  Out intent is to see whether the remarkable economic per-
formance of China can be ascribed, at least partially, to this evolution of the country’s le-
gal, economic and political institutions and its financial markets.   
In this paper we use a panel of data from the Chinese provinces to study the rela-
tionship between measures of the development of legal and political institutions, indicators 
of financial market development and economic growth. Based on a sample of 31 Chinese 
provinces for the period 1986-2002, our empirical results indicate that those regions with 
greater rule of law, more property rights awareness more political pluralism are associated 
with stronger growth. We believe these findings further our understanding of the “Chinese 
economic miracle”, and consequently add to the growing literature relating to law, institu-
tions, finance and economic growth. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I provides a description of insti-
tutional reforms and financial sector development in China over the last two decades. Sec-
tion II reviews the relevant literature. Section III describes our data and the various meas-
ures we employ for institutional development. In Section IV, we present our results and 
examine the relationship between institutional development and growth in China.  Con-
cluding remarks are found in Section V.   
 
 
2  Decentralization, institutional reform and financial  
sector development  
 
The transition from planned to market economy necessitates the establishment of almost 
entirely a new set of institutions.  However, the ambition of the Chinese Communist Party 
to retain a monopoly on political power prevents the full emergence of the rule of law and 
the power of local governments over a wide range of issues that could potentially undermi-
ne the coherence of national policy. Nevertheless, with the ideological shift and institu-
tional development made so far, China has gradually experienced the emergence of legal 
institutions, decentralization of political institutions, rapid growth of the private sector and 
the development of financial markets.   BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Institutional change in China can be divided into three distinct stages. The first 
stage includes the years between 1979 and 1993 when a variety of transitional institutions 
emerged through experiments and innovations. The second stage begins around 1994 when 
most of the old revolutionaries were gone from the political scene. The strategic shift in the 
official ideology led to completely abandoning central planning and embracing a market 
system. The third stage begins in 2002 when China acknowledged its desire to be part of 
the world community and began to revise legislation in order to fulfill its obligations under 
the WTO agreements. 
In order to further explore our research question, background information on some 
important aspects of the institutional development in China needs to be highlighted.  
Reforms of Chinese SOEs  After nearly thirty years of reform, the Chinese state 
owned enterprises (SOEs) remain one of the most intractable problems in the economic 
system (Chen and Feng, 2000).  In 1978, the restructuring of the SOEs was initiated and 
designated by the Chinese governments as the core of the economic reform.  Instead of 
privatizing the SOEs, the Chinese government chose to restructure them by increasing 
autonomy in managerial decisions and by creating financial incentives at the enterprise 
level. In the 1980s, the state experimented with various approaches to rejuvenate the SOEs, 
the contract responsibility system (CRS) and corporatization. The essential idea of CRS is 
to grant managerial autonomy to SOEs and apply profit-sharing rules to motivate the firms 
while maintaining state ownership.  Corporatization refers to converting SOEs into share-
holding companies with limited liability with the objective of protecting SOE management 
from government interference. The experiment of corporatization began in 1984, and was 
kept in a low profile until late 1991, when it was greatly promoted by the establishment of 
two stock exchanges in Mainland China. In 1997, the 15th Party Congress meeting intro-
duced a “differential treatment” strategy to SOE reform, namely “protection of the large 
and release of the small.” Smaller state-owned enterprises were asked to “find their own 
solution” and by 2001 the government retained only 60% of the firms that were state 
owned in 1996. The process of SOE reform since 1978 can be viewed as a gradual decen-
tralization in the management of state enterprises; management authority has shifted from 
government bureaucrats to SOE managers. 
Emergence of the Private Sector  The distinguishing feature of a market economy 
as opposed to a planned economy is individuals have control over their own property (Hoff 
and Stiglitz, 2004). Over the last two decades, the private sector in China has grown from Iftekhar Hasan, Paul Wachtel and Mingming Zhou  
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an extremely restricted and ignored sector into a powerful growth engine for China’s econ-
omy (Bai, Lu and Tao, 2006).  
An early form of privatization, known as the “Wenzhou Model,” was based on 
capital accumulation in a family and village environment of small enterprises. In the late 
1980s, regulations regarding shareholding enabled these enterprises to define property 
rights and separate collective and private enterprise shares which led to de facto privatiza-
tion in some areas. From 1992, enterprises were offered the chance to convert to a limited 
liability structure in anticipation of the Company Law that was then under consideration by 
the National People’s Congress in Beijing which only came into effect in 1994.  
Investor protection has the power to create the incentive to accumulate capital and 
thus promote economic growth (Castro, Clementi and MacDonald, 2004). The 1994 Com-
pany Law improved property rights by establishing the firm as a legal entity that owns the 
firm’s assets.  A further move towards privatization and confirmation of private property 
rights was made in 2000, when provincial authorities propagated a ‘deepened system re-
form’ aiming at reducing all public enterprise shares to less than 50% and effectively giv-
ing private entrepreneurs a majority share in local enterprises. Implementation of the Com-
pany Law and support extended to private enterprises by local state institutions differed 
from region to region. Privatization and the acknowledgement of property rights were the 
outcome of local political enactment that followed the national legislation.  
Overall, the establishment of private property rights in China has been an incre-
mental process from the introduction of usage rights to the acknowledgment of individuals 
as owners of capital and from collective rights to the establishment of firms as the legal 
owners of assets. The speed of this process depended on local politics, that is, the operation 
of local networks that provide firms with private property rights protection and contractual 
security and access to many non-tradable resources (Krug and Hendrischke, 2001).  
FDI Policy  In hoping for the spillover effects from multinational enterprises to 
domestic industries (Javorcik, 2004), the Chinese government decided to open a window 
for foreign investment; two coastal provinces, Guangdong and Fujian, were allowed to 
adopt “special policies” to attract more international business. In 1980, four special eco-
nomic zones (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen) with special privileges were estab-
lished. Their success led the central government to grant special autonomy to fourteen ad-
ditional coastal cities in 1984 and other areas were added in subsequent years.  Addition-
ally, many inland cities that do not enjoy the special status established their own develop-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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ment zones with tax benefits. As a result, FDI increased sharply from $4.4 billion in 1991 
to $28 billion in 1999. Dayal-Gulati and Husain (2002) and Havrylchyk (2005) examine 
the influence of FDI on growth at the provincial level.  
Reform of Budgetary policy  Beginning in 1979, the Chinese government began 
to replace state budget allocation with bank loans. In 1995, the new “Budget Law” took 
effect, which prohibited the central government from borrowing from the central bank, re-
quired that local governments balance their budgets and restricted the local governments 
from bond issuance or borrowing in the financial market. The Central Bank Law in 1995 
reduced the influence of local governments on monetary policy and credit allocation deci-
sions. Furthermore, decentralization occurred as fiscal expenditures were reallocated from 
the national to state and local governments.  
In 1980, the profit tax began to substitute for profit remittances to the state sector, 
though the various tax reform measures were complicated and subjected to abuse, which 
resulted in a decrease in tax revenue (Blejer and Szapary, 1990). Since 1988, enterprises 
have the right to decide on their own investments and a bidding system was established.  In 
1994, China introduced major tax and fiscal reforms, which made a clear distinction be-
tween national and local taxes, thus making it very difficult for local governments to re-
duce national taxes as they did in the past.  
Banking Reform Credit markets in China are relatively large by international stan-
dards (the assets of deposit money banks is a larger share of GDP than it is in the US), 
however credit to the private sector is a much smaller share of GDP than most other coun-
tries.  So the strange structure of the financial system was ripe for the reforms that did not 
start until 1994 when the central government decided to separate the policy banks from 
commercial banks and established three policy-lending banks and four specialized com-
mercial banks (the so-called three-tier system). The banking reforms thereafter include, 
among others: (1) establishing a central bank; (2) transforming the urban credit coopera-
tives into commercial banks (1996-1998); (3) granting limited licenses to some foreign 
banks; (4) granting licenses to non-state commercial banks; (5) reducing government inter-
vention in credit allocation; (6) loosening interest rate controls; (7) recommending standard 
accounting and prudential norms.  
Though these changes in banking policy are important, serious banking sector prob-
lems remain: under-capitalization, large percentage of bad loans, continued extensions of 
low-interest policy loans to state enterprises, and corruption and other abuses by bank loan Iftekhar Hasan, Paul Wachtel and Mingming Zhou  
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officers. The non-performing loans of the state banks are the major obstacle to their effi-
cient performance. However, major changes in the banking sector began with China’s en-
try into the WTO in 2001. These include further liberalization of interest rates, fewer re-
strictions on ownership and increased operational freedom. Recent developments include 
partial privatization with shares sold in the market and minority foreign ownership stakes.    
Establishment of stock market  The establishment of the Shanghai Stock Ex-
change in 1990 and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1991 was initially aimed at promot-
ing the SOE reforms. In early 1992, tens of thousands of SOEs sought permission to re-
structure into shareholding companies. Furthermore, in 1992, the central government as-
sumed formal policy-making powers and re-organized stock market regulatory institutions. 
However, at the same time, local leaders retained significant influence over the listing 
process and the enforcement of secondary market regulation. The illegal participation of 
financial institutions (e.g. investment banks and insurance companies) in the stock market 
exacerbated the situation. By 2000, the central regulatory authority had consolidated its 
powers and the influence of local government was significantly reduced. The stock market 
regained the confidence of public investors, and has enjoyed rapid expansion since then.  
Rousseau and Xiao (2006) however do not find any effect of stock market development 
from 1995-2005 on real economic activity although they did find that banking sector de-
velopments played an important role 
Corporate bond market Corporate bonds markets lagged behind the development 
of equity and government bond markets. Corporate bonds were first issued in 1986 and for 
a long time, the corporate bond listings were small and other trading was explicitly prohib-
ited.  Outstanding issues in 1999 were only about one-half of one percent of GDP (People's 
Daily, Sept. 1, 2000). However, the corporate bond market began to expand thereafter 
when new rules governing issuance were implemented.   
There are various reasons why the development of the corporate bond market was 
slow. First, the process for corporate bond issuance is extremely cumbersome, as three dif-
ferent bodies, including the State Development Planning Commission, which allocates 
quotas on the basis of regional and sectoral balance, must approve all new issues.  Second, 
the issuing enterprise must seek recommendations and guarantees from the local govern-
ment and the ministry responsible for its sector. Third, the interest rate on the corporate 
bonds cannot exceed more than 40 percent of deposit interest rate with the same term. Such 
stringent restrictions on issuers’ qualifications, issuance amounts and pricing of new non-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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financial corporate issues, along with the inadequate supervision and legal framework, lack 
of investor diversity and low liquidity has kept the corporate bond market from playing a 
major role in the economy. 
However, some progress has also been observed recently, as the Chinese govern-
ment is paying more attention to the importance of corporate bonds in the capital market. 
Specifically, the right to issue corporate bonds has been extended from mega-size SOEs to 
local enterprises, controls governing fund usage have been eased, and interest rates for 
corporate bonds have being increasingly determined by market forces. The liquidity of 
corporate bonds is on the rise, and risk control mechanisms for corporate bonds are im-
proving, as more and more issuers have opted for bank guarantees instead of guarantees by 
related enterprises (China Daily, Hong Kong Edition, July 25, 2003) 
  Development of the political environment With the end of the Cultural 
Revolution in 1977, political reforms began in addition to the changes in economic struc-
ture that have been addressed so far. Deng Xiaoping used his theory of "socialism with a 
Chinese character” to reinterpret old principles and subtly start adjustments to the political 
regime.  The Communist Party was very successful in carrying out the economic reforms 
and maintaining social and political stability at the same time. 
The rudiments of a legal system were reintroduced in 1979 and members of the le-
gal profession were rehabilitated. As part of its economic and legal reforms, China adopted 
a patent law to protect foreign patents in 1984.   
At the same time the Party still claimed that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" was 
in place and it continued to dominate political life.  Economic reform was accompanied by 
an increase in economic crimes such as embezzlement and corruption which were dealt 
with harshly by the Communist regime. The repressive regime restricted expressions of 
opinion about the reform process and there were tensions between the Communist Party 
and those who advocated political pluralism. The Party continued to forbid the organiza-
tion of any political opposition, except for a “Political Consultative Conference,” which 
consists of all different parties in China, and provides political consultation and advice for 
the Communist Party.  It is notable that even though the objective of the conference is to 
increase the representativeness of different viewpoints, members of the Communist Party 
still occupy a significant proportion of the seats in the conference. Political reforms and 
democracy have lagged behind economic reform, which has brought economic freedom Iftekhar Hasan, Paul Wachtel and Mingming Zhou  
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and diversity to China and which may lead to greater opening and democracy in China's 
political institutions. 
This brief introduction to the major changes in economic and political institutions 
in China shows two things.  First, the reform process has already touched on a broad range 
of economic, political and social areas of life. Second, the uneven pace of reform leads to 
considerable variation across the country and over time in institutional development. In the 
rest of the paper, we will try to exploit these differences over time and place to better un-
derstand the determinants of growth.  
 
 
3  Literature review 
 
The link between institutional development and economic growth has gained increasing 
interest among researchers in recent decades. Since our review of institutional reform in 
China has emphasized three facets of such development – legal-, financial- and political-
intuitions, we focus here on the literature that links these issues to the economic develop-
ment of China.  
An important stream of research focuses on the development of legal and financial 
institutions and economic growth (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; La Porta, Lo-
pez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Wachtel, 2001). 
Well-defined property rights and related rules ensure that the use and trading in these rights 
is fair and transparent and that abuses are appropriately punished. Furthermore, the protec-
tion of property right facilitates the development of well-functioning financial markets. In 
an era of entrepreneurship, well-functioning and flexible financial markets may allow en-
trepreneurs to embrace economic opportunities and respond to technology shocks (Bau-
mol, 1990). Using data on Chinese entrepreneurs, Djankov, Qian, Roland and Zhuravskaya 
(2006) highlighted the importance of legal and economic institutions in fostering entrepre-
neurship. Jonhson, McMillan and Woodruff (2002) examine the relative importance of 
property rights and external finance in several transition countries. They find property 
rights to be overwhelmingly important. Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) separate proxies for 
the security of property rights into two groups, i.e., those measuring the risk of expropria-
tion and those measuring the ease and reliability of contract enforcement, and their cross-
country results suggest that risk of expropriation is the more severe impediment to eco-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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nomic development. Following the same definition of security of property rights and Chi-
nese firm level data, Cull and Xu (2005) indicate that at China’s current stage of develop-
ment, expropriation risk, contract enforcement, access to finance, and ownership structure 
all appear to matter for Chinese firms' reinvestment decisions.  
Political institutions, as one component of the institutional framework, have been 
recognized to exert crucial influence on economic growth. In a transition economy, an im-
proving democracy may have significant effect on political and economic conditions of a 
country (Rodrik and Wacziarg, 2006). Researchers often used the degree of democracy or 
level of corruption to capture the contribution of political institutions. Corruption, often as 
a signal of the quality of political institutions, imposes substantial economic costs, particu-
larly in less developed economies (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Empirical evidence from 
some cross-country or cross-region studies (Mauro, 1995; Hall and Charles, 1999) confirm 
that corruption negatively affects aggregate outcomes such as growth and investment rates.   
An aspect of political institutional development that is beginning to attract more at-
tention is the link between political pluralism and economic liberalization and develop-
ment. In democratic politics, pluralism is a guiding principle that permits the coexistence 
of different interests. Political pluralism plays a role in economic growth because there 
may be an intrinsic connection between the dispersal of political power inherent in the 
competitive market economy and political pluralism (Rodrik and Wacziarg, 2006). Repre-
sentativeness, accountability and transparency are essential aspects of well-functioning po-
litical institutions and since political institutions play a dominant role in determining eco-
nomic policies, one would expect that economic liberalization should be positively related 
to the degree of political pluralism in the country or region.  
There are some other studies that examine the disparities among China’s different 
provinces (Borensztein and Ostry, 1996; Liu and Li, 2001), but very few of them make ef-
forts to incorporate the role of institutions. However, there are two recent studies that look 
at province-level data on financial sector development and two more that focus on institu-
tional developments. Aziz and Duenwald (2002) and Boyreau-Debray (2003) both find lit-
tle influence of financial sector depth at the provincial level on growth primarily because 
little credit growth in the 1990s went to the private sector.  Chen and Feng (2000) find that 
growth of private and semi-private enterprises leads to an increase in economic growth 
while the presence of SOEs reduces growth rates among the provinces based on their sam-
ple 29 Chinese provinces from 1978 through 1989. In addition, Biggeri (2003) uses pro-Iftekhar Hasan, Paul Wachtel and Mingming Zhou  
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vincial level data for the period 1986 to 2001 and finds that the level of aggregate output in 
each province is negatively influenced by the presence of state owned enterprises, a proxy 
for the extent of marketization of the economy.  These early studies of inter-provincial dif-
ferences in growth indicate that more careful specifications of institutional development 
are clearly called for and data that extends into the post-2000 era is needed. 
 
 
4  Data and methodology 
 
Empirical research using cross-country data has provided much insight on the role of insti-
tutions in promoting economic growth (King and Levine, 1993; Knack and Keefer, 1995; 
Rousseau and Wachtel, 2000). However, cross-country studies are sometimes faulted for 
being unable to distinguish between the proximate determinants of growth and country 
specific idiosyncrasies. Although it might be tempting to examine Chinese experiences by 
making comparisons with transition experiences in Europe and the former Soviet Union, 
the unique transition path chosen by China would make this approach unreliable.  
The use of sub-national data has major advantages over cross-country studies in ad-
dressing these issues.  The data comparability issue, for example, is less serious within a 
country than across countries. While the comparison of institutional and political character-
istics across countries can be difficult due to the diversity in historical experiences, cultural 
norms and institutional contexts, sub-national data can control for such contexts and focus 
on specific aspects of the institutional and political system. Our sample consists of a panel 
for 31 provinces
1 in Mainland China with annual data for 1986-2002.  
Our dependent variable, growth, is the growth rate of real annual per capita GDP in 
the province.
2 The province-level GDP data and the other macroeconomics variables were 
collected from China Economic Information Network Database. The original sources of 
these data are the annual issues of the Statistics Yearbook of China.  
A major challenge in this paper was to find data that adequately measure or proxy 
the institutional issues of interest.  As we shall see, in some instances direct measures of 
                                                 
1 The 31 provinces, including four municipalities with the same level of authority as the provinces are Anhui, 
Beijing, Chongqing, Fujian, Gansu, Guangdong, Guangxi, Guizhou, Hainan, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Henan, 
Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Jilin, Liaoning, Neimenggu (Inner Mongolia), Ningxia, Qinghai, Shanxi, 
Shandong, Shanghai, Shanxi, Sichuan, Tianjing, Xinjiang, Xizhang, Yunnan, Zhejiang. 
2 The variable is defined as the change in the log of real per capita GDP. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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institutional development can be obtained while in other instances the available data pro-
vide only imperfect proxies. We will begin with the financial institutions for which direct 
measures are obtainable and widely used in growth studies. We will then proceed to the 
legal and political institutions for which proxies provide indirect but adequate representa-
tions.  
For the development of the financial sector, we use two measures of financial 
depth, one based on banks alone and the other on non-bank sources of private sector fi-
nancing: 
(1) The ratio of total bank loans to GDP measures banking sector depth. Bank loans 
data are obtained from the annual issues of the Almanac of China's Finance and Banking 
(ACFB).  This measure is not available prior to 1989 and so for the three missing years we 
use state owned bank loans.  The two series are very similar, in early years when the state-
owned banks dominated the banking sector.  The data are linked using the ratio of the se-
ries in 1994 (the year prior to major financial reforms). 
(2) The ratio of equity and non-financial corporate debt (long-term and short-term) 
issuance to GDP is a measure on non-bank financial market activity.  The issuance is for 
firms incorporated in the province.   In the sense that the issuance of IPOs and corporate 
bonds represents the activities of the capital markets, this ratio also captures the degree of 
development of financial institutions such as investment banks, accounting firms, supervi-
sory bodies, etc.  The IPO data are from Statistics Yearbook of Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange and the corporate bonds issuance data are collected from the ACFB.  The 
bond data are available until 1999 and the later data are extrapolated for each province 
based on the growth in national bond issuance.  
We turn now to variables that represent legal and related institutional develop-
ments. 
(3) The prominence of the private sector in a province is measured by the ratio of 
private sector total fixed investment to overall total fixed investment. As suggested by Cull 
and Xu (2005), the extent of private ownership is an indicator of property rights. This 
measure reflects the relative size of the private sector, and also the extent of property right 
protection, fairness in the area and the of local governments support of the private sector 
entrepreneurship. The data are from the China Economic Information Network Database 
and the original source of data on total capital formation is the China National Statistics 
Bureau. Iftekhar Hasan, Paul Wachtel and Mingming Zhou  
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(4) The rule of law is always difficult to measure; we take the presence of legal pro-
fessionals as an indicator.  Specifically, our variable is the number of lawyers per 10,000 
people. This ratio should capture the degree of development of public integrity mecha-
nisms, which promote public accountability and limit corruption. The data are collected 
from the Statistics Yearbook of China’s Legislation and the Statistics Yearbook of each 
province.  The data are available for 1990, 1995 and annually from  2000. Missing years 
are interpolated based on nation wide growth in the number of lawyers.  
(5) Similarly, the awareness of property rights is proxied by the ratio of the number 
of trademark applications to the number of firms. This ratio should capture both awareness 
of property rights and the degree of development of secure property rights-associated insti-
tutions in each province. The trademark data are collected from the Almanac of China’s 
Property Rights and Yearbook of China’s Industrial and Commercial Administrative Sta-
tistics. The data are only available from 1998 and are backcasted using the national data 
and the proportions of applications in the province in 1998.  
(6) Although political pluralism is in its rudimentary stages in China, the extent to 
which non-Communist Party members participate in the People’s Congresses is an indica-
tor of its strength.  Our variable is the proportion of non-party members in the provincial 
People’s Congress relative to the proportion in the National People’s Congress.
3 If the pro-
vincial proportion of non-Communist Party members is higher than the national bench-
mark at that time, then the province arguably has a more relaxed or pluralistic political en-
vironment 
The data are collected from the regional People’s Congress Yearbooks of each 
province in China (“Difang Zhi – Renmin Daibiao Dahui Zhi”) which are complied inter-
mittently by regional committees.  Even though yearbooks are published for most of the 
provinces, the information on membership structure is not always available.  Another data 
source for the People’s Congress data was the Examination and Approval Reporting 
Document issued by the Examination Committee of People’s Congress which addresses 
                                                 
3   The proportion of non-Communist Party members in the People’s Congress at the national level is not just 
average of the ratios of all provinces in China; instead, it is the proportion of non party member from the Na-
tional People’s Congress.  National People’s Congress members are elected from the Congress members at 
the province level. This national measure is an excellent indicator of the overall political environment in the 
whole country, in the sense that just before each once-in-5-year election year, the national-level Standing 
Committee of the People’s Congress will issue a recommendation of membership structure of the to-be-
elected new Congress members, both applied to national People’s Congress, and various sub-level Con-
gresses. Such recommendations have binding powers because the ex-post membership structure are required 
to be reasonably close to the recommended structures of various membership.   BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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whether the newly-elected People’s Congress members of the provinces have conformed to 
the recommended benchmarks from the national-level People’s Congress. In such exami-
nation reports, there is often a declaration of the number and proportions of members who 
are representing various classes or parties. Still, there are six provinces for which we can-
not find any information of the membership structures of the People’s Congress, and those 
missing data are estimated judgmentally by using data from neighboring provinces with 
similar political characteristics.  Since the People’s Congresses are re-elected every five 
years, the proportions of non-Communists in the Congress hold constant for every five 
years, roughly at the intervals of 1983-1987, 1988-1992, 1993-1997, and 1998-2002. 
(7) Finally, we include three control variables that are commonly found in growth 
rate studies.  First, the log of real initial (or lagged) GDP per capita will provide evidence 
of any convergence effects.  Second, a secondary school enrollment ratio controls for the 
influence of human capital investments on growth. Only limited time series information on 
schooling was available at the provincial level. Our variable is the ratio of total number of 
students enrolled in secondary school to the number of graduates from primary school. The 
data are from the Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China 
(for 1986-98) and for later years, the China Statistical Yearbook. Third, the ratio of exports 
to GDP is a measure of openness of the local economy. 
Descriptive statistics and variable names are shown in Table 1 and Table 2 presents 
the correlation matrix of the variables. The median real GDP growth rate is 7.0 percent and 
the standard deviation is almost as large. The explanatory variables also show a great deal 
of variation. There range indicates that there are outlier observations though no effort was 
made to exclude such observations other than to include fixed effects for provinces in some 
regressions. Interestingly, the simple correlations with the growth rate of GDP are all mod-
est. The level of GDP is highly correlated with the schooling, openness and the institu-
tional variables.  Interestingly, the correlation of the level of GDP is not as highly corre-
lated with the financial variables or the size of the publics sector.  
Our model builds on the approach to growth equations introduced by Barro and Le-
vine (1991). The baseline equation includes the convergence effect (log of initial real 
GDP), the human capital investment variable (schooling) and the export ratio (openness). 
We will show that the baseline regression provides a reasonable framework for analyzing 
growth in China. We then add measures of financial sector development, institutional de-
velopment and political pluralism to the baseline regression.   Iftekhar Hasan, Paul Wachtel and Mingming Zhou  
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The models are estimated in three different ways.  First, OLS regressions with ro-
bust standard errors are shown in Table 3. It is well known that OLS estimates are biased 
and inconsistent when there are dynamic effects and simultaneities in the specification.  
The growth literature takes two different approaches to dealing with the estimation issues.  
The first is to simply use a multi year averages growth rate as the dependent variable and 
to use initial year values for all the independent variables. In Table 4 we show results with 
three-year average growth rates so that the number of observations is reduced.
4  These es-
timates include fixed effects for provinces, which are not shown in the table. Since all the 
independent variables are predetermined, the simultaneity bias is reduced.  
To more fully account for the dynamic simultaneity effects, the recent literature has 
utilized the GMM techniques developed by Arellano and Bond and others for panel esti-
mation.  Thus, we also use a panel data estimation technique to correct for possible bias 
due to endogeneity. Table 5 presents the equations with annual data estimated with the 
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation technique, i.e., one-step system GMM esti-
mations.
5 We treat all of the financial and institutional variables as endogenous and the 
baseline variables as exogenous. Instruments were chosen from financial, legal and politi-
cal variables that are not part of the model. The regression table includes two tests for the 
validity of the instruments. The null hypothesis of the Sargan test is that the instruments 
are not correlated with the residuals and the null hypothesis of the AR(2) test is that the 
first difference equation used in the estimation procedure does not have second order serial 
correlation.  In both instances a failure to reject supports the instrument choice. The last 
two rows of the table indicate a failure to reject (a high p) in most instances.  
 
 
5  Results and interpretation 
 
The same specifications are shown in all three regression tables. Absolute values of t-
statistics are reported in parentheses in all the regression tables and *, **, *** indicate sig-
nificance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The first equation reports the baseline 
model – regressions that only include the log of lagged real GDP per capita, the secondary 
                                                 
4 There are six periods starting with 1986-88 though the last (2001-02) is just two years. 
5 This is an augmented version outlined in Arellano and Bover (1995) and developed in Blundell and Bond 
(1998) and Bond (2002) provides an explanation of this approach. Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) use the 
technique to estimate growth equations similar to ours with three year average cross country panel data. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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school enrollment ratio and openness. The second equation relates growth to the financial 
variables while equation three shows the baseline growth model augmented by the two 
measures of financial sector development.  Similarly, equations four to six introduce the 
legal institutions variables. They are shown by themselves to illustrate the overall correla-
tions and then as part of the growth model.  Equation six presents the growth model aug-
mented by both the financial and institutional variables.  Equations eight to ten introduce 
the political pluralism variable in the same fashion. The robustness of the results to some 
changes in specification is shown in the remaining equations (6, 11 and 12).   
The broad picture presented by the results is consistent with our expectations. Al-
though, coefficient estimates and confidence levels vary from equation to equation and be-
tween the three-year average and dynamic panel estimates, the overall picture is supportive 
of out hypotheses. In the following discussion we will comment on the estimates with the 
two approaches to reducing simultaneity bias (results in Tables 4 and 5). 
To begin the baseline regression provides some evidence of a convergence effect. 
In the there year average fixed effect regressions, the convergence effect is small and in 
line with expectations while in the dynamic panel estimates it is unstable and sometimes 
unbelievably large. The effect of the secondary school enrolment rate variable on growth is 
consistently positive and significant although the impact is numerically small.  The open-
ness variable is positive and significant with the three year fixed effects regressions but not 
with the dynamic GMM estimates. The baseline variables perform better in the three-year 
average regression in Table 4 than in the dynamic estimates in Table 5.  
Turning to coefficients on the measures of financial sector depth, bank loans to 
GDP and capital market activity to GDP are both significant in the 3-year average regres-
sions.  With GMM, the bank depth variable often has the wrong sign and the capital market 
depth variable is often insignificant. The two variables are not highly correlated (0.19) but 
the results are sensitive to variation in the specification. The banking depth variable is 
widely used in cross-country studies to demonstrate the relationship between finance and 
growth and the results are robust. However, in this instance there might be good reason 
why it may not have a positive influence on growth. That is, bank loans that are predomi-
nantly non-performing loans to SOEs are hardly likely to be growth inducing.  The capital 
market depth variable reflects private sector activity and therefore might be more relevant 
in the Chinese context.  Iftekhar Hasan, Paul Wachtel and Mingming Zhou  
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  The impact of financial sector deepening on growth implied by our results is 
fairly large.  The 3-year average regressions (Table 4) suggest that the coefficient on the 
bank loan ratio is about 0.1 and the coefficient on the capital market depth is about 0.6.  
Now, consider an increase of each variable by one standard deviation (0.26 and 0.02 re-
spectively from Table 1).  Such an increase in bank depth increase the growth rate by 2.6 
percentage points (0.1 x 0.26) and a one standard deviation increase in the capital market 
depth increases the growth rate by 1.2 percentage points. With the GMM estimates, the 
capital market ratio effect is almost twice as large although the bank loan effect is often 
negative or insignificantly different from zero. 
  The best results for the variables measuring the development of legal institu-
tions and the size of the private sector are found with the GMM estimates.  Looking at the 
results with GMM in Table 5, we see that the size of the private sector has a strong and 
significant positive effect on growth.  If the private sector investment ratio increases by .25 
(the sample mean is 0.36) then the growth rate would go up by about 2.5 percentage points.    
  The two measures of legal development – property rights awareness (trade 
marking) and rule of law (lawyers) – have a simple correlation of 0.61. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that the coefficients are sensitive to what is included in the equation and the es-
timation procedure used.  Consider equation 5 in Table 5, which includes all the institu-
tional and baseline variables but omits the financial depth measures.  A one standard devia-
tion increase in either the rule of law measure or the property rights measure would lead to 
an increase in the growth rate of less about 1.7 percentage points. The magnitudes of these 
results are just suggestive since the coefficient estimates are a bit unstable. 
  Finally, we introduce our measure of political pluralism, the relative presence 
of non-party members in the province People’s Congress. The coefficients are positive and 
significant with the GMM estimates but not significant with the 3-year average regressions 
where the coefficients are positive but small. The coefficients in Table 5 suggest that a one 
standard deviation increase in relative pluralism is associated with as much as a one-half 
percentage point increases in the growth rate. The results with the 3-year average growth 
rates are only a tenth of this or less. The pluralism variable is only observed once every 
five years when an election is held and remains the same between elections. Thus, the 
GMM results may be picking up some of the autocorrelation in growth rates in addition to 
the effects of inter-province political pluralism.   
 BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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6  Conclusion 
 
Since China’s economic success is virtually unparalleled in recent history, the transitional 
path that the country has followed may be unique as well. Thus it is important to see whet-
her and how the specifically Chinese institutional structures transitions have exerted its ef-
fect on economic growth. In this paper, we review the institutional development in China 
since the start of reforms, and empirically examine the role of institutional development on 
economic growth, using cross-province sample. Our evidence, in general, indicates the 
strong role of institutional development in promoting economic growth.  
We investigate three facets of institutional development: financial sector develop-
ment, development of legal institutions and the development of legal institutions.  The first 
facet is represented by measures of financial deepening which we find has a strong influ-
ence on growth.  Proxies for institutional development are harder to identify.  A broad 
measure is simply the size of the private sector in the economy, which we find to have a 
strong influence on growth.  It reflects the degree of protection of property rights, fairness 
of the judicial system, extent of allowance and tolerance of the local governments to the 
private sector and the extent of local entrepreneurship. Direct measures of legal develop-
ment are harder to specify. We are able to identify proxies for the awareness of property 
rights and for the rule of law. Our measures are indicators of the extent to which institu-
tions adequately protect property rights and provide an environment with mechanisms for 
public integrity mechanisms that promote accountability and limit corruption. There is 
modest support with our proxy measures for the influence of institutional development on 
growth.  Finally, the third facet is the development of political institutions, which we 
measure by the degree of political pluralism.  Here as well there are indications that the 
development of institutions leads to growth. 
   Taken as a whole, our evidence suggests that institutional development is 
strongly associated economic growth, based on the 31 Chinese province data for period 
1986-2002. More specifically, those regions with more rule of law, more property rights 
awareness and protections, more innovation-friendly environment, more open environment 
for private and foreign investors, and more investment opportunities and more complete 
market institutions are associated with stronger growth. 
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Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Annual growth rate in per capita real GDP   516  0.070  0.062  -0.174  0.217 
Real per capita GDP, RMB (lagged)  516  1704.1  1441.9  420.0  12694.3 
Exports to GDP  515  0.125  0.152  0.012  1.018 
Secondary School Enrollment Ratio  517  0.853  0.119  0.396  1.000 
Bank Loans to GDP  512  0.857  0.282  0.316  2.925 
Equity and Debt Issuance to GDP  517  0.010  0.022  0.000  0.360 
Trademark applications per firm  
(Awareness of property rights)   513  0.418  0.584  0.002  5.013 
Lawyers per 10,000 (Rule of law)  516  0.672  0.694  0.102  7.446 
Ratio of private sector capital investment to 
total (Private sector presence)   514  0.374  0.154  0.025  0.703 







      1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
1 Real per capita growth in GDP  1                            
2 Initial  per  capita  real  GDP  0.223  1          
3 Exports  to  GDP  0.173  0.581  1         
4 Secondary  School  Enrollment  Ratio  0.271  0.564  0.317  1        
5 Bank  Loans  to  GDP  0.001  0.337  0.134  0.251  1       
6 Equity & Debt Issuance to GDP  0.180  0.216  0.171  0.152  0.216  1         
7 Awareness  of  property  rights  0.252 0.558 0.324 0.412 0.407 0.106 1       
8 Rule  of  law  0.207 0.775 0.453 0.462 0.608 0.225 0.609 1     
9 Private sector presence  0.287  0.356  0.237  0.257  -0.298 -0.024 0.385 0.179 1   
10 Relative Pluralism  0.075  0.272  0.147 0.062 0.071 0.111 0.29  0.218 0.112 1 
  Table  3 
 
  OLS Regressions of real capita GDP growth, annual data 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  11  12 
0.033  0.061*** 0.080  0.026*** 0.139**  0.182*** 0.217*** -0.006  0.006  0.148**  0.099  0.119* 
Constant  (0.64) (7.23) (1.52) (3.29) (2.02) (2.64) (3.01) (0.23) (0.12) (2.13) (1.46) (1.81) 
0.006   0.001   -0.013  -0.020**  -0.017*   0.003  -0.021**  -0.016  -0.017*  Log of Initial per capita 
Real GDP   (0.91)   (0.13)   (1.34) (2.06) (1.78)   (0.37) (2.18) (1.63) (1.70) 
0.042**   0.042**   0.037*  0.037*  0.037*    0.042** 0.037** 0.040** 0.034*  Exports to GDP 
(2.23)   (2.30)   (1.82) (1.89) (1.94)   (2.33) (1.98) (2.05) (1.83) 
0.074***   0.084***   0.089*** 0.097*** 0.101***   0.081*** 0.101*** 0.095*** 0.094***  Log of Secondary school 
Enrollment rate  (2.71)   (3.17)   (3.04) (3.46) (3.68)   (2.99) (3.62) (3.30) (3.32) 
 0.006  -0.011    0.002  -0.032***   0.004  0.013    Bank loans to GDP 
  (0.62) (1.32)     (0.17) (2.89)     (0.30) (1.16)  
 0.498***  0.384**    0.418***  0.417***    0.400***   0.388***  Equity and debt issuance 
to GDP   (2.78)  (2.38)    (2.96)  (2.69)    (2.96)   (2.96) 
   0.085***  0.084***  0.094***     0.096***  0.098***  0.092***  Private sector presence 
   (4.26)  (3.68)  (3.65)     (3.72)  (4.01)  (4.23) 
   0.015***  0.010*  0.009  0.012*    0.009  0.009  0.011*  Rule of law 
      (3.64) (1.78) (1.36) (1.78)     (1.31) (1.43) (1.94) 
   0.010*  0.008  0.009  0.020***    0.006     Property rights 
   (1.72)  (1.50)  (1.42)  (3.44)    (1.00)    
       0.075***  0.054**  0.042*  0.050*  0.040  Relative pluralism 
       (3.03)  (2.02)  (1.65)  (1.94)  (1.58) 
N  513 510 507 508 508 502 503 516 513 502 506 512 
R
2  0.0887 0.0342 0.1044 0.1020 0.1346 0.1577 0.1269 0.0164 0.0963 0.1622 0.1405 0.1531 
F-statistic  17.86 5.04  10.91 20.28 14.35 11.43 10.88 9.16  16.27 11.76 14.00 15.20 





   Table 4   Fixed effects regressions of 3-year average real GDP per capita growth 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12 
0.099 -0.020  0.166*  0.088*** 0.287**  0.191 0.225 -0.017  0.068 0.189 0.133 0.228* 
Constant  (0.99) (1.08) (1.81) (5.51) (2.07) (1.36) (1.65) (0.28) (0.67) (1.33) (1.08) (1.84) 
-0.003   -0.024*    -0.026 -0.024 -0.032*    -0.008 -0.025 -0.019 -0.025  Log of Initial per 
capita 
Real GDP   (0.21)   (1.96)   (1.31) (1.26) (1.77)   (0.58) (1.28) (1.03) (1.36) 
0.146***   0.129***   0.069  0.106** 0.107**   0.131** 0.103*  0.114** 0.053  Exports to GDP 
(2.86)   (2.83)   (1.24) (1.99) (2.01)   (2.54) (1.91) (2.10) (0.98) 
0.110***   0.131***   0.126*** 0.128*** 0.140***   0.121*** 0.130*** 0.125*** 0.128***  Log of secondary 
school 
Enrollment  rate  (2.78)   (3.73)   (2.96) (3.21) (3.70)   (3.04) (3.18) (3.07) (3.09) 
 0.109***  0.108***     0.093*** 0.099***    0.091*** 0.110***   Bank loans to GDP 
  (4.67) (4.93)     (3.37) (3.70)     (3.26) (4.39)  
 0.743***  0.608**     0.613** 0.606**     0.615**   0.838***  Equity and debt  
issuance 
to  GDP    (2.84) (2.40)     (2.36) (2.33)     (2.36)   (3.28) 
   - 0 . 1 3 6 * * *   -0.104*  -0.052     -0.049  -0.049  -0.074  Private sector pre-
sence 
   (2.74)  (1.94)  (1.02)     (0.95)  (0.94)  (1.41) 
   0.055***  0.046*** 0.015 0.012     0.015 0.015 0.039***  Rule of law 
   (4.76)  (3.27)  (1.01)  (0.82)    (1.00)  (1.02)  (2.82) 
   0.015  0.017  0.003  0.001    0.003     Property rights 
   (1.33)  (1.40)  (0.25)  (0.06)    (0.24)    
       0.076  0.071*  0.010  0.007  0.042  Relative pluralism 
       (1.30)  (1.66)  (0.26)  (0.18)  (1.03) 
N  181 180 179 180 180 178 178 182 181 178 179 181 
R
2  0.1074 0.0545 0.1098 0.0193 0.0597 0.0870 0.1087 0.0135 0.1270 0.0900 0.0703 0.1030 
ρ  0.2066 0.3523 0.4743 0.4119 0.4036 0.5174 0.4655 0.0571 0.1806 0.5080 0.5345 0.3654 
P for F test that all 
u_i=0  0.7561 0.0545 0.0034 0.5143 0.3101 0.0248 0.0073 0.9997 0.8334 0.0464 0.0311 0.3595 





   Table 5     Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM results 
    1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8  9 10  11  12 
0.033 -0.041  0.329*** -0.001 0.038  -0.055  0.517*** -0.606*** -0.261** 0.533* -0.158 0.115 
Constant   (0.64) (1.41) (3.06) (0.04) (0.26) (0.14)  (2.64) (4.48)  (2.34) (1.72) (0.74) (0.41) 
0.006   -0.017   0.002  0.059  -0.051**  -0.036** -0.117** -0.046* -0.084**  Log of Initial per 
capita 
Real GDP   (0.89)   (1.22)   (0.09) (0.88)  (2.00)   (2.40) (2.04) (1.71) (2.32) 
0.042*    0.026   0.048*  0.066  0.012   0.048 -0.004  0.043 0.022  Exports to GDP 
(1.90)   (0.79)   (1.91) (1.33)  (0.33)   (1.58) (0.10) (1.38) (0.61) 
0.074***  0.151***  0.077*** 0.065 0.126***  0.158*** 0.205*** 0.169*** 0.176***  Log secondary 
school  
Enrollment  rate (3.24)   (4.04)   (2.81) (1.05)  (2.75)   (4.09) (3.55) (4.56) (4.58) 
 0.122*** -0.168***  -0.214*** -0.136***    -0.085 -0.021   ank loans to GDP 
  (3.00) (4.80)     (3.15)  (3.51)     (1.00) (0.64)  
 1.015  1.129***   1.623  1.701***    1.449**    1.880*  Equity and debt  
issuance 
to  GDP    (1.32) (2.99)     (0.95)  (3.87)     (2.50)   (1.73) 
   0.114*** 0.088* 0.084*        0.085  0.100* 0.144**  Private sector pre-
sence     (3.39)  (1.70)  (1.79)      (0.59)  (1.68)  (2.13) 
   0.050*** 0.029 0.118*  0.009     0.080*  0.008 0.035  Rule of law 
      (2.81) (1.01) (1.65)  (0.32)     (1.70) (0.24) (0.91) 
   -0.005  0.036**  0.127***  0.056***    0.011      Property rights 
      (0.25) (2.23) (2.97)  (3.25)     (0.20)    
        0.670***  0.606*** 0.373* 0.555*** 0.495***  Relative pluralism 
        (5.00)  (3.64)  (1.72)  (3.74)  (3.10) 
N  513 505 506 494 501 489  488 503  508 492 499 499 
Wald  Chi2  49.90 35.51 45.63 65.48 75.23 35.46  38.41 24.99  39.60 37.68 61.89 57.08 
P-value of Sargen's 
Test  .  0.074 0.401 0.167 0.010 0.707  0.441 0.977  0.775 0.337 0.051 0.227 
P-value  of  AR(2)  0.365 0.361 0.649 0.876 0.604 0.464  0.595 0.096  0.061 0.439 0.340 0.113 
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